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Interest groups have, of course, long had a role in judicial elec-
tions (or, for that matter, judicial appointments). Interest groups
provide necessary funding for elective judges to reach voters. They
are also intermediaries between judicial candidates and voters in the
sense that they assist candidates in communicating with, and in mo-
bilizing, voters. Interest groups can also provide important cues to
voters about the attitudes and values of judicial candidates. In a re-
cent superior court race in California, for example, one candidate
obtained the endorsements of the Sacramento County Deputy Sher-
iff's Association and the Sacramento Police Officers' Association.'
If a voter knew nothing else about the candidate-for example, did
not know that the candidate had been a police officer for fourteen
years or a prosecutor for fifteen years-those endorsements would
provide a hint that the candidate was viewed as being pro-law en-
forcement. In states where the parties are not heavily involved in ju-
dicial elections, interest groups become crucial in providing cues to
voters about the attitudes and values of judicial candidates and in
mobilizing voters for the elections.
Although interest groups are often discussed in a pejorative
manner, they are essential to the functioning of a pluralist
* Professor, School of Social Sciences, The University of Texas at Dallas.
This paper was prepared specifically for the Summit on Improving Judicial
Selection. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the National Center for State
Courts, the Joyce Foundation, or the Open Society Institute.
1. These endorsements (along with other interest group endorsements) are
found in Gary Delsohn, Spending, Integrity Hot Issues in Judge Race,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 10, 2000, at B1.
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democracy. Political scientists Theodore Lowi and Benjamin Gins-
berg define interest groups simply as "a group of individuals and or-
ganizations that share a common set of goals and have joined to-
gether.., to persuade the government to adopt policies that will help
them."2 Although interest groups are ordinarily examined in the
context of legislative politics, interest groups have a role in all
branches of government including the judicial branch.
The earliest texts on interest groups recognize that they attempt
to influence courts. Interest groups do so for at least three reasons:
(1) they believe they need to balance the views of other groups; (2)
they wish to convince jurists to adopt their views as law; and (3) they
wish to cut losses in the event they fail to persuade the executive or
legislative branches to adopt their viewpoints.
3
There have been several changes regarding interest group in-
volvement in judicial elections. Interest groups are increasingly na-
tional in scope. Additionally, the number of interest groups and the
amounts of money and other resources contributed by these groups to
judicial candidates have vastly increased. In 1968 the Encyclopedia
of Associations counted 10,300 interest groups; in 1988 it counted
20,600.4 During World War II there were 500 registered lobbyists in
Washington; today there are 25,000.5 The number of political action
committees registered with the federal government grew from 608 in
1974 to over 2500 in 1980 to about 4000 in 1994. And something
else has changed. As judicial races have become more competitive,
campaign costs have risen dramatically. Judicial candidates need the
substantial resources offered by interest groups to win.
2. THEODORE J. Lowi & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT:
FREEDOM AND POWER 307 (6th ed. 2000).
3. See Jackson Williams, Irreconcilable Principles: Law, Politics, and the
Illinois Supreme Court, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 267, 296 (1998) (paraphrasing
Lee Epstein, Interest Group Litigation During the Rehnquist Court Era, 9 J.L.
& POL. 639 (1993)). Epstein provides a bibliography of works on interest
groups and the law in LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., PUBLIC INTEREST LAW (1992).
4. See G. Calvin MacKenzie, The Revolution Nobody Wanted, TIMES
LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 13, 2000, at 12 (citing the Encyclopedia of Asso-
ciations).
5. See id.
6. See JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 22, 24 (3d ed.
1997); MacKenzie, supra note 4.
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Interest groups today often draw no distinction between achiev-
ing their goals through the courts or through the political process.
The result can be an unhealthy dependence between judicial candi-
dates and interest groups where interest groups back judicial candi-
dates to secure their political agendas and candidates rely on interest
group backing to achieve and to retain judicial office. For some
analysts of judicial politics, this new interest group involvement in
judicial politics is more than unhealthy; it challenges the appearance
of judicial impartiality. Some analysts go further and suggest that
judges are becoming "captives" of influential interest groups.
7
II. THE OLD JUDICIAL POLITICS
The old style of judicial campaign was a low budget affair
where the judicial candidate spoke to any group willing to hear a dull
speech about improving the judiciary or about judicial qualifications.
There were numerous hands to shake, bar and newspaper endorse-
ments to obtain, and that was about it. Judicial candidates might ad-
dress some interest groups-a union local or a medical society, for
example-and might even obtain their endorsements. If the candi-
date was an incumbent who had avoided scandal or attack for a
highly visible, controversial decision, victory was likely. Indeed,
such a candidate would not likely have an opponent. And, for an in-
cumbent in a retention election, victory was virtually guaranteed.
For an open seat, if the judicial candidate had an attractive name, a
popular political party affiliation, or a good ballot placement and
perhaps a newspaper or bar association endorsement, the candidate
had a good chance to be elected.
To the extent that there was interest group involvement in judi-
cial races, it was activity by competing segments of the bar. For civil
court judgeships, trial lawyers might oppose a candidate supported
by the civil defense bar; for criminal courts, prosecutors might
7. See American Friends Service Committee-Northeast Ohio Office and
Ohio Religious Leaders for Campaign Finance Reform, Ohio Supreme Justice
for Sale (Jan. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Loyola of Los An-
geles Law Review); see also Texans for Public Justice, Payola Justice: How
Texas Supreme Court Justices Raise Money from Court Litigants, at
http://www.tpj.org/reports/payola/summary.htrl (last visited Feb. 21, 2001).
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support a candidate opposed by the criminal defense bar. However,
even this interest group involvement was low budget and low key.
III. THE NEW JUDICIAL POLITICS
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, there began to be
indications that the nature of judicial elections was changing. In
1978, deputy district attorneys in Los Angeles encouraged opposition
to judges they believed were soft on crime.8 Shortly afterward, trial
lawyers in Texas began pouring money into Texas Supreme Court
races, and that money was soon followed by money from civil de-
fense interests.9 The changes did not happen at the same time in all
states, but in some places judicial campaigns became more competi-
tive and more expensive. Initially, competing segments of the bar
became more involved in judicial races-primarily through cam-
paign contributions that were increasingly needed by judicial candi-
dates for the advertising necessary for competitive campaigns.'
0
The press began to take note of the pitched battles, especially in
races for the Texas Supreme Court, that were occurring between the
trial lawyers and civil defense bars.1 However, that state seemed an
anomaly. In 1980, its judicial races for the Supreme Court were the
first in the million-dollar range and then it was the first state that
faced numerous defeats for incumbent judges at all court levels. 12
Large campaign contributions and grass roots campaigning by
interest groups in judicial elections were soon not unusual. Rather
than Texas judicial elections being an anomaly, it was actually the
8. See Alexander Wohl, Justice for Rent, AM. PROSPECT, May 22, 2000, at
34.
9. See Mark Hansen, A Run for the Bench, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 69-70.
10. See Aaron Chambers, How High the Bar?, ILL. ISSUES, Oct. 2000,
available at http://illinoisissues.uis.edu/bar.htm.
11. See Stephen B. Bright, Can Judicial Independence Be Attained in the
South? Overcoming History, Elections, and Misrepresentations About the
Role of the Judiciary, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 817 (1998).
12. The million-dollar campaign in 1980, however, was mostly self-funded
by a wealthy incumbent seeking election. See Walt Borges & Mary Hull,
Bullock Puts Plan on a Fast Track, TEX. LAW., Dec. 5, 1994, at 4. It was in
1984 that the first million-dollar campaign actually happened with nonself-
funded dollars. It was a race for chief justice where one candidate raised about
$1.4 million. See Anthony Champagne, Judicial Reform in Texas, 72
JUDICATURE 146, 150 (1988).
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harbinger of things to come in other states. In 1986 the retention
elections in California heated up. With capital punishment as a ma-
jor issue, three California justices were defeated in a multimillion
dollar retention election battle.' 3 Time and again, death penalty
cases would, as in California in 1986, prove the lightning rod in judi-
cial elections. In North Carolina in 1986 and in 1990, the chief jus-
tice was attacked for his voting to reverse a handful of death sen-
tences. As he described a campaign,
Some of the campaign debate got really grizzly. My oppo-
nents would bring up all the times I had dissented in cases
involving the imposition of the death penalty, and I had to
come back and demonstrate all the times I had concurred in
cases sustaining the death penalty. So, it emerged into a
battle of statistics.14
In Ohio there were also hotly contested, expensive contests for
the state supreme court that involved plaintiff-defense interests.'
5
Alabama soon began to receive media attention for the costly battles
between trial lawyers and civil defense interests in Alabama Su-
preme Court elections. One scholar described Alabama as "a battle-
ground between businesses and those who sue them."' 6 That battle,
he wrote, "is often fought in elections for the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama." 17 In the 1994 Supreme Court elections, a rancorous battle
occurred where trial lawyers and business groups backed opposing
candidates for the five seats that were up for election.' 8 A precipi-
tating factor in this battle was a 1993 Alabama Supreme Court deci-
sion19 that had declared unconstitutional a package of tort reform
legislation. The result was a continuation of the trial lawyer-business
interest battles every two years as seats came up for election.
13. See Scott D. Wiener, Note, Popular Justice: State Judicial Elections
and Procedural Due Process, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 187, 198-99
(1996).
14. Id. at 199 n.92.
15. See id. at 198.
16. Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study
ofArbitration Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645, 656 (1999).
17. Id. at 657.
18. See id.
19. See Henderson ex rel. Hartsfield v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878
(Ala. 1993).
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Between 1986 and 1996, the cost of running for the Alabama Su-
preme Court rose 776% and one journalist described the races as
changing from "low-key races" to "expensive mud-wrestling con-
tests."
20
While there is greater diversity in interest group involvement in
judicial races than plaintiff-defense interests and crime control inter-
ests, those interests have proven to be the most involved in judicial
elections in most states. Trial lawyers and unions on the one hand,
and civil defense lawyers, business groups, and professional groups
on the other, battle in judicial campaigns on civil law issues. In the
criminal law, a judge worries about being branded "soft on crime."
As former Justice Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court put it,
Every judge's campaign slogan, in advertisements and on
billboards, is some variation of "tough on crime." The lib-
eral candidate is the one who advertises: "Tough but fair."
Television campaigns have featured judges in their robes
slamming shut a prison cell door.... Most judges may see
themselves as umpires between the state and the citizen, but
many citizens regard judges as part of law enforcement, and
plenty of candidates will offer themselves for that role. A
conscientious judge who imposes less than the maximum
possible sentence in cases evoking public outrage invites a
bidding war with future opponents.
20. Ware, supra note 16, at 659 (quoting Shiela Kaplan, The Very Best
Judges That Money Can Buy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 29, 1999, at
35).
21. Hans A. Linde, Elective Judges: Some Comparative Comments, 61 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1995, 2000-01 (1988). Melinda Hall found that reelection con-
cers have influenced liberal justices to join conservative majorities in death
penalty cases in four states. See Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and
Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54 J. POL. 427 (1992). Earlier
studies found no statistically significant relationship between judicial selection
methods of judicial decisions in the treatment given governmental, criminal,
corporate, or "underdog" litigants. See Williams, supra note 3, at 296-97.
However, a recent study found that awards in cases with out-of-state defen-
dants are much higher in states with partisan elected judges than in states with
other systems of selection. See Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court




IV. IT'S NOT JUST TEXAS (oR ALABAMA)
By the early 1990s, a look at judicial politics in the states shows
that interest groups were taking a more active role in judicial elec-
tions in numerous states.22 Region of the country made no differ-
ence, population of the states made no difference, and it even made
no difference if the judges were elected in partisan or nonpartisan
elections. And, although retention elections rarely result in the de-
feat of a judge, there have been notable exceptions.
3
Former Federal Judge and Congressman Abner Mikva, com-
menting on the 2000 Illinois Supreme Court elections, noted that in
Illinois judicial elections, "every special interest in the state-the in-
surance, the defense bar, everybody-is in there with big bucks to
promote their candidates." 24 Three candidates for the Illinois Su-
preme Court spent more than $1 million each and another spent al-
most that much.25 On an inflation-adjusted basis, these million dollar
campaigns tied the previous record in 1992, when $580,000 was
spent.
26
Ohio has long faced intense interest group involvement in its ju-
dicial races, especially between business groups and the civil defense
bar on the one hand and trial lawyers and unions on the other. The
increased battling between these interests in Ohio has led to large in-
creases in the costs of judicial elections. In 1980 the race for chief
justice of the Ohio high court cost $100,000; six years later the race
22. Perhaps because of the intense media attention to Texas' and Alabama's
judicial politics, there has been an inaccurate assumption that interest group
activity is the greatest in those two states. For example, in 1998 one scholar,
discussing the role of interest groups in judicial elections, claimed, "[b]ut in at
least two states, Alabama and Texas, where judges are chosen in partisan elec-
tions, it is widely known that interest groups have taken to campaigning for
and against judicial candidates much as they do in elections for offices in the
so-called political branches of government." Williams, supra note 3, at 294.
23. See Bright, supra note 11, at 847-48 (citing a Tennessee Supreme Court
election where ajustice was defeated after a surprise attack).
24. Mark Schauerte, Fund-raising for Supreme Court Primaries Breaks Re-
cords, Cm. LAW., Mar. 2000, at 10.
25. See Chambers, supra note 10, at 14, 15.
26. See id. The $580,000 spent in 1982 would equate to slightly over
$1,000,000 in the year 2000. A readily accessible multiplier for the consumer
price index is available at http:llstats.bls.gov/cpihome.htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2001).
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cost $2.8 million.27 This pattern of civil defense interests backing
one candidate and plaintiffs' interests the other, along with large
campaign costs, continued in the 2000 supreme court elections.2 8 In-
deed, the Ohio elections have been so high profile that it was one of
four states chosen by the Constitution Project of Washington, D.C. to
conduct extensive voter education efforts on court races.29 The other
three states, also with hotly contested court battles having extensive
interest group involvement, primarily from competing civil defense
and plaintiffs' interests, are Alabama, Illinois, and Michigan.3' All
four of these states' judicial elections were explicitly targeted for
business activity by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
3 1
Illustrative of the national links among interest groups involved
in judicial elections is the creation of Michigan's M-Law, a pro-
business organization that spends money for advertising and other
public outreach in an effort to influence Michigan judicial elec-
tions.32 The Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Michigan State
Medical Society, and several Michigan trade associations created M-
Law in the 1990s. However, also involved in its creation was a
Washington, D.C. based organization, the American Tort Reform
Association, a national pro-business interest group. Borrowing from
earlier efforts in Oklahoma, M-Law has published evaluations of
both the Michigan Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals to de-
termine the extent to which the judges reflect pro-business values.
3 3
M-Law has also been significantly involved in making independent
expenditures and has run noncandidate-specific education ads on
television and on radio that highlighted such things as the
27. See Hansen, supra note 9, at 69.
28. See Catherine Candisky, High Court Races, Once Dignified, Now
Down, Dirty, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 1, 2000, at IA.
29. See James Bradshaw, Watchdog Group Sets Its Sights on Ohio Supreme
Court Race: Some Say Special Interests Having Too Much Influence,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 6, 2000, at 4B.
30. See Bradshaw, supra note 29; John D. Echeverria, Changing the Rules
by Changing the Players: The Environmental Issue in State Judicial Elections
1, 17 (unpublished paper, on file with Loyola ofLos Angeles Law Review).
31. See Echeverria, supra note 30, at 17.
32. See Michigan Lawsuit Abuse Watch, at http://www.mlaw.org/
whoweare.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2001).
33. See Robert Ankeny, Consumer Groups, Trial Latyers Upset Over
Evaluations, CRAIN'S DETROIT BUs., Nov. 2, 1998, at 44.
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contributions of trial lawyers to judicial campaigns.3 4 In the 1996
elections, M-Law spent over $311,000 on television ads and S46,000
on radio advertising.35 M-Law is, of course, only a small part of the
overall battle between competing interests in Michigan's judicial
elections. However, it does show several important developments in
interest group politics: (1) interest groups are no longer just local or-
ganizations, but sometimes have national connections; (2) techniques
developed in one state in judicial elections may be quickly taken up
and used in other states, such as judicial evaluations by interest
groups; and (3) independent expenditures by interest groups can be
both large and influential in affecting judicial elections. Indeed, the
continuing nationalization of state judicial elections is further shown
by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's recent efforts through the In-
stitute for Legal Reform to support the election of pro-business
judges in Alabama, Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi, and Ohio.36 The
goal is both to make direct campaign contributions and to pay for is-
sue advertising. 37 The evaluations of judges in terms of their pro- or
anti-business judicial behavior that began in Oklahoma have now
been used in not only Michigan, but also in Louisiana and Missis-
sippi.
38
Nor are interest group activities limited to the largest states or to
tort law. In Mississippi in 1992, a justice was defeated in the Demo-
cratic primary by an opponent who "ran as a 'law and order candi-
date' with the support of the Mississippi Prosecutors Association."
39
A concurring opinion of the justice, one consistent with U.S. Su-
preme Court precedent, was used to attack the justice for his view
that the Constitution did not permit the death penalty for rape where
no loss of life had occurred. 40 The justice was also attacked, as
claimed by his opponents, for believing that "a defendant who 'shot
an unarmed pizza delivery boy in cold-blood' had not committed a
34. See Echeverria, supra note 30, at 54-62.
35. See id. at 55.
36. See id. at 17.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 11.
39. Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be
Done Amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges front Office for Unpopu-
lar Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 316 (1997).
40. See id. at 316-18.
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crime serious enough to warrant the death penalty."'4 1 Actually, he
had wanted to remand the case for a new sentencing hearing.42 Two
years earlier, another Mississippi justice was defeated for being "soft
on crime" and the successful challenger in that race as well had the
support of the Mississippi Prosecutor's Association.43
While no Oklahoma judge has lost a retention election, there has
been a pattern of lower percentages of favorable votes for judges. In
1986 the Oklahoma District Attorneys Association opposed a Court
of Criminal Appeals judge because of a perception that he opposed
the death penalty.44 In 1996 Citizens for Judicial Review, an organi-
zation created by a Tulsa public relations firm with ties to conserva-
tive interests, spent $150,000 on election eve ads and news releases
in opposition to a Court of Civil Appeals judge in a retention elec-
tion.45 In 1997 the public relations firm created Oklahomans for Ju-
dicial Excellence that claimed support from fifty-two associations
and corporations. 46 In 1998 this organization spent $250,000 on
Oklahoma judicial elections and prepared "scorecard" ratings of
judges, and the Christian Coalition distributed 1.4 million of these
ratings.47 The activities of Oklahomans for Judicial Excellence were
said to have "stricken fear into the judiciary."48
In Tennessee a supreme court justice was defeated in a retention
election in part because of the opposition of the Republican Party
and of Republican leaders, but also because of interest group opposi-
tion. Six weeks prior to the retention vote, the headline of a Nash-
ville newspaper read "Court Finds Rape, Murder of Elderly Virgin
Not Cruel. Tennessee Conservative Union Says 'Just Say No to Jus-
tice White."' The court had unanimously agreed with the appellate
court that the defendant in this case was entitled to a new sentencing
41. Id. at 318.
42. See id.
43. See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of
Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital
Cases, 75 B.U. L. REv. 760, 764-65 (1995).
44. See Robert Darcy, Conflict and Reform: Oklahoma Judicial Elections







hearing.49 Three justices, including the defeated justice, commented
that the evidence was insufficient to show an aggravating circum-
stance beyond a reasonable doubt as required by state law. That
case, however, became the mechanism for interest group and politi-
cal party efforts to make the justice the first in Tennessee to ever be
defeated in a retention election. A mailing sent by the Tennessee
Conservative Union opened with a description of the crimes of Rich-
ard Odom:
78 year-old Ethel Johnson lay dying in a pool of blood.
Stabbed in the heart, lungs, and liver, she fought back as
best she could.
Her hands were sliced to ribbons as she tried to push the
knife away.
And then she was raped.
Savagely ....
But her murderer won't be getting the punishment that he
deserves.
Thanks to Penny White."
Interestingly, there was heavy use of faxes by Justice White's
opponents, showing not only adaptability to new technology by in-
terest groups involved in judicial elections, but also the use of a far
less expensive communications medium than mail. Another justice
listed as a top target of groups that opposed Justice White announced
the year after White's defeat that he would not seek another term.51
Recent judicial campaigns in Nevada, a nonpartisan election
state, have been less visible. Casino and gambling interests have
great influence in Nevada's judicial elections. A few years ago, one
Nevada justice received $80,000 in contributions from these inter-
ests. 52 In 1998 two members of the Nevada Supreme Court received
nearly half their contributions from casino interests, and individual
49. See State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 21 (Tenn. 1996).
50. Bright, supra note 39, at 313.
51. See Bright, supra note 11, at 849 n.195.
52. See Sheila Kaplan & Zoe Davidson, The Buying of the Bench, THE
NATION, Jan. 26, 1998, available at http:/past.thenation.coml1998/980126
.htm.
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casinos were the judicial candidates' largest contributors. 53 It should
not be surprising that gambling interests have a major role in Nevada
elections, of course, any more than the coal industry in West Vir-
ginia, a partisan election state.
54
In Idaho's May 2000 supreme court elections, a justice was de-
feated by a combination of factors. The justice authored a decision
that upheld a federal reserved water rights claim in three wilderness
areas. 55 That decision became a focal point in the election contest.
Although officially nonpartisan, the two opposing candidates' parties
were easily determinable - much like Ohio and Michigan. The
Democratic incumbent had been appointed by a Democratic gover-
nor, had married into a well-known Democratic family, and had been
involved in liberal causes 5 6 The Republican challenger launched his
campaign by speaking at a Republican Party fund-raising banquet
and was endorsed by state Republican Party leaders. 57 The Demo-
cratic incumbent's main interest group support was the Idaho Trial
Lawyers Association; the Republican challenger's support included
resource and agricultural interests as well as the Idaho Christian
Coalition.58 Substantial independent expenditures were involved in-
cluding a push poll against the incumbent that appears to have been
funded by a South Carolina group.59 One political action committee,
the Concerned Citizens for Family Values, ran full-page newspaper
ads on the Sunday prior to the election that proclaimed, "Will partial
birth abortion and same-sex marriage become legal in Idaho? Per-
haps so if liberal Supreme Court Justice Cathy Silak remains on the
Idaho Supreme Court."60 Other ads were run by gun advocates that
53. See Shannon Davis, Courting the Casinos: Judicial Elections in Las
Vegas and Nevada, Center for Investigative Reporting, at http://www.
muckraker.org/stories/991123-justice/cs-nevada.html (last visited Feb. 21,
2001).
54. See Kaplan & Davidson, supra note 52.
55. See In re SRBA, 1999 Ida. LEXIS 119 (1999).
56. Echeverria, supra note 30, at 21.
57. See id. at 24, 27.
58. See id. at 24.
59. See id. at 30.
60. See id. at 31.
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suggested the justice would support gun registration. The justice was
defeated by sixty percent of the vote.
6 ,
In Wisconsin, one study of supreme court elections in the past
ten years found that the money for the races came overwhelmingly
from a small number of contributors, most of whom were lawyers
and lobbyists with a small number of large law firms. Recent
spending for chief justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court came to
$1.3 million, twice the spending record set two years earlier and ten
times the spending of a campaign twenty years earlier.
62
V. IT Is NOT JUST STATE SUPREME COURTS
Nor are expensive judicial campaigns fueled at least in part by
interest group contributions limited to the states' highest courts.
From 1976 to 1994 the median amount of money spent by a candi-
date for the superior court in California increased twenty-three
fold-from about $3000 to $70,000. It is likely that one trial court
race in Sacramento this year will cost a total of $750,000, and al-
though much of that money is self-funded by one of the candidates,
substantial amounts will also have to be raised from other interests
such as attorneys who may well appear before the court. 63 Las Ve-
gas trial court judges receive contributions from casino interests as
do other local elected officialsF6 In the Lackawanna County, Penn-
sylvania Court of Common Pleas in 1995, the candidates in the gen-
eral election for one seat spent $1 million. In 1997 the three top can-
didates in the primary election for that county court spent over
$600,000, more than the total spent by the eight successful candi-
dates for the superior court, a statewide office.
65
61. See id. at 19-33.
62. See Wohl, supra note 8.
63. See Marjie Lundstrom, No Ethical Missteps, Pair Running for Judge
Insist, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 10, 2000, available at http://www.sacbee.com/
voices/news/old/old.voices04_20000910.htmnl.
64. See Kaplan & Davidson, supra note 52.
65. A.B.A. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON
LAWYERS' PoLmcAL CONTRIBUTIONS, PT. 2, at 83 (1998).
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VI. INTEREST GROUP ACTIVITIES OTHER
THAN CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
While the extent of interest group activity in judicial races may
only involve making campaign contributions to judicial campaigns,
some groups play other roles. Some interest groups may make inde-
pendent expenditures that benefit candidates for judicial office.
These contributions are not reported in judicial candidates' contribu-
tion statements and neither the funds nor the advertising it buys are
in control of the candidate. From the candidate's perspective, such
independent expenditures may not always be desirable since, for ex-
ample, it may lead to advertising that goes "off-message" from the
image the candidate would like to project. In the race for chief jus-
tice of North Carolina in 1986, for example, Citizens for a Conser-
vative Court began running ads and holding demonstrations on
courthouse steps in opposition to the challenger to the chief justice.
The incumbent wrote of the organization's tactics,
Some of their tactics ... were offensive, and I asked them
to discontinue them, but as they were in no way associated
with my campaign, I had no means of controlling them. I
have no idea whether their tactics had an overall positive or
negative impact on the election results, but I know that they
offended a large number of people. I also was unable ef-
fectively to dissociate myself from their tactics in the minds
of some people, even after the election was over. A signifi-
cant negative effect of their work was that some of the peo-
ple whose financial support I had counted upon were influ-
enced to make their contributions to the CCC instead of
directly to my campaign .... 66
In Ohio in the 2000 elections, one issue advocacy group spent
nearly $3 million. The group, Citizens for a Strong Ohio, describes
itself as dedicated to educating the public about the state supreme
court elections. As an issue advocacy group, it is exempt from dis-
closure requirements and from contribution limits. 67  However,
66. E-mail from Rhoda Billings to Anthony Champagne, (Oct. 16, 2000)
(on file with author).
67. See William Hershey & Mike Wagner, Group Files Complaint About
Anti-Resnick Ads, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Oct. 18, 2000, at IA.
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Common Cause of Ohio has recently filed a complaint that the group
should be considered a political action committee, and therefore
subject to disclosure requirements and contribution limits, because it
is attempting to influence the outcome of the supreme court elec-
tions.
68
VII. IDEOLOGICAL INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED
The various segments of the bar and the clients they represent
remain the leading interests involved in judicial elections. However,
other interests do get involved, often mobilized by a "hot-button" is-
sue with which the court has dealt. In 1996, for example, in Ne-
braska a supreme court justice was defeated in a retention election
because he became a target of a $200,000 campaign by those op-
posed to the court's rejection of term limits for elected officials.
69
The justice had authored a unanimous opinion holding the term lim-
its initiative invalid because it did not comply with a constitutional
amendment that increased the number of signatures required to put
the measure on the ballot.70 The justice received only thirty-two per-
cent favorable votes in the retention election.7
In 1990 the chief justice of Florida had to raise $300,000 to re-
tain his seat against anti-abortion groups that sought to defeat him.7
2
In 1992 anti-abortion groups challenged another justice who was also
opposed by prosecutors and police organizations for her dissenting
opinion in a death penalty case.
73
In 1996 a district judge in Utah received only a fifty-one percent
favorable vote after he was opposed by women's and gay rights
groups who campaigned against him on the grounds that he was soft
on crimes against the two groups.74 In Utah only one judge has ever
68. See id.
69. See Hansen, supra note 9, at 68, 70.
70. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the In-
dependence of State Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72
NOTREDAME L. REV. 1133, 1134 (1997).
71. See id.
72. See id. at 1140.
73. See id.
74. See Stephen Hunt, Judicial Elections Offer Few Thrills but Get Job
Done, SALT LAKE TIB., Oct. 15, 2000, at Al, available at http://vww.sltrib.
con/2000/oct10152000/nation-w/33478.htm.
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been defeated in a retention election and generally judges receive fa-
vorable votes in the eighty percent range.
75
In 1998 a coalition of anti-abortion groups announced a $2 mil-
lion campaign to defeat two California Supreme Court justices in re-
tention elections.76 Though the coalition never surfaced, justices
were forced to raise money in an effort to fend off the threatened
challenge.77 The executive director of the Christian Coalition of
Florida considers judicial elections to be "the next hot-button issue"
for his group.78 In Alabama the Christian Coalition recently sur-
veyed judicial candidates prior to making endorsements. According
to the Judicial Inquiry Commission, some of the questions called for
the candidate to comment on issues likely to come before a judge or
"embroiled the judicial candidate in political debate." 79
One recent study of environmental issues in judicial elections
recommends that environmental groups become involved in judicial
elections by devoting time and resources to state judicial races and
by educating their members and the public about the effects of judi-
cial decisions on the environment. The study also recommends that
environmental groups borrow from the business community and pre-
pare evaluations of judges because, it is argued, "if the judicial se-
lection process remains a political process, and if that process has di-
rect and important implications for environmental policy, it is
entirely appropriate for environmental groups to help voters educate
themselves about the consequences of their choices in the voting
booth.
' 0
One recent comprehensive study of judicial elections in Penn-
sylvania strongly suggests that economic interests, however, seem to
overwhelmingly dominate financial contributions to judicial races.
Of $3,129,783 contributed by PACs and law firms to thirty-five
Pennsylvania Supreme Court candidates from 1979 to 1997,
only eighteen groups were labeled "ideological" groups, and they
75. See id.
76. See Hansen, supra note 9, at 69.
77. See id.
78. Kaplan & Davidson, supra note 52.
79. Politics and Judges, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Sept. 13, 2000, available at
http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/Sep2000/13-politics.html.
80. Echeverria, supra note 30, at 74-75.
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contributed only $25,053.81 In contrast, groups categorized as "busi-
ness" groups gave $2.5 million and consisted of 290 PACs and
firms. 8 2 Four hundred eighty labor PACs gave about $527,000.S
3
However, a focus on financial contributions of ideological groups
underestimates their importance, since these groups can provide vol-
unteers for campaigns and most importantly mobilize their support-
ers to cast votes at the polls.
VIII. So WHAT?
One can, of course, identify cases that raise concerns about the
entanglement of interest groups and judges. In Louisiana, for exam-
ple, a federal court addressed a challenge to rules that reduced the
ability of law student legal clinics to practice in state courts." Busi-
ness groups had strongly opposed the activities of the Tulane Envi-
ronmental Law Clinic and had written the court to express their op-
position.8 5 Business groups had also contributed substantial sums to
supreme court candidates.86 Although the court dismissed the plain-
tiffs' complaint, the judge noted the "close temporal relationship
between the business community's expression of outrage and the
subsequent changes" in court rules. 7 Wrote the judge, "[I]n Louisi-
ana, where state judges are elected, one cannot claim complete sur-
prise when political pressure somehow manifests itself within the ju-
diciary."
' 8
The public in many states favors the election of judges and
would not support an appointive system. However, there are indica-
tions that the new judicial politics has resulted in a decline in the ap-
pearance of justice in state courts. A recent national survey of public
81. See James Eisenstein, Financing Pennsylvania's Supreme Court Candi-
dates, 84 JUDICATURE 10, 17 (2000).
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See S. Christian Leadership Conference v. Sup. Ct. of La., 61 F. Supp.
2d 499 (E.D. La. 1999).
85. See id. at 501.
86. See Mark Kozlowski, The Soul of an Elected Judge, LEGAL TIMEs,
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opinion and the court system found that eighty-one percent of re-
spondents believed that "[j]udges' decisions are influenced by politi-
cal considerations." 89  Seventy-eight percent believe "e]lected
judges are influenced by having to raise campaign funds."90 These
national survey findings are supported by state surveys. In Texas,
eighty-three percent of respondents thought judges were influenced
by contributions in their decisions. 91 A Pennsylvania poll showed
that eighty-eight percent thought judicial decisions were influenced
by contributions made to judicial campaigns.92 An Ohio poll found
that ninety percent of Ohioans believed political contributions af-
fected judicial decisions.93 A Washington poll found that seventy-six
percent of the respondents believed judges were influenced by politi-
cal decisions and sixty-six percent by having to raise campaign
funds.
9 4
Interest groups will vigorously proclaim their goal of ensuring a
level playing field in the courts and promoting fairness, but the pub-
lic senses otherwise. The result is what appears to be a widespread
belief that the new judicial politics introduces bias and unfairness
into the state courts.
Yet the evidence points to continued expansion of interest group
activity in judicial elections. There has already been a vast expan-
sion of interest group involvement, a nationalization of that activity,
and a recent call in an academic paper for a further expansion of in-
terest group activity.95 Additionally, it is clear that interest groups do
have an impact on judicial races. In an era of thirty-second televi-
sion advertisements, interest group advertising can hold considerable
sway over the electorate, and the independent expenditures of
89. Nat'l Ctr. For State Courts, How the Public Views the State Courts, pre-
sented at the National Conference on Public Trust and Confidence in the Jus-
tice System (May 14, 1999), at 41-42.
90. Id.
91. See Chief Justice Tom Phillips, State of the Judiciary, available at
http://www.tomphillips.com/state.htm (Mar. 29, 1999).
92. See ELLEN MATTLEMAN KAPLAN, BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE OF
JUDICIAL SELECTION REFORM 2 (1999).
93. See A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 65, at 123.
94. See David B. Koch, Futures Trading in Judicial Elections, WASH. ST.
BAR NEWS (June 2000), available at http://www.wsba.org/bamews/2000/
09/koch.htm.
95. See Echeverria, supra note 30, at 74-75.
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interest groups can be especially hard-hitting since they are free of
ethical constraints. The result will be more and more interest group
involvement in judicial elections in the future.
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